Some lessons from scientific practice on its development and growth of knowledge. On Feyerabend’s perceptive view in epistemology by Abazi, Hajdin
THESIS - Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring 2019
International Research Journal
Some lessons from scientific practice on its 
development and growth of knowledge. On 
Feyerabend’s perceptive view in epistemology 
Hajdin Abazi
How to cite this article:  
Abazi, H. (2019). Some lessons from scientific practice on its development and growth of 
knowledge. On Feyerabend’s perceptive view in epistemology. Thesis. Vol. 8. Iss. 1. 
Pristina: AAB College. (115-137). 
Published online: June 8, 2019 
Article received on the 14th of March, 2019. 
Article accepted on the 12th of May, 2019.
Conict of Interest: The author declares no conict of interests.
ISSN: 1848-4298 (Print) ISSN: 2623-8381(Online)
/2018
Volume 8 
Number 1
Spring 2019
pISSN 1848-4298
oISSN 2623-8381
Original Article 
Thesis, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2019     115 
Some lessons from scientific practice on its 
development and growth of knowledge 
On Feyerabend’s perceptive view in 
epistemology 
 
Hajdin Abazi, PHD, Prof. Assist. 
AAB College, Pristina, Kosovo   
Email: hajdin.abazi@aab-edu.net 
 
Abstract 
Feyerabend generally is known most for his discovery on 
the helpfulness of breaking rules when they become a 
hindrance and for the legitimacy of the counter-inductive 
approach as a way to make fundamental changes in science. 
But his view about the decontamination of old theories and 
the implantation of new theories‘ conception deserves equal 
recognition. And, of course, his alternative of open instead 
of closed exchange is invaluable as epistemological 
contribution. All this together make Feyerabend‘s viewpoint 
very distinct, especially to understand the need of openness 
as a condition to make easy the scientific development. 
Those three aspects constitute the originality of 
Feyerabend‘s contribution in the philosophy of science, 
which will be the focus of this paper. These novelties, as it 
will be argued, fill respective aspects where previously there 
were shortcomings, which made possible to clarify 
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epistemologically the understanding and explanation, 
according to the practice, how the development of science 
and the growth of knowledge were attained (and as a 
consequence how they usually go). The approach of the 
treatise pursues the historical context and the theoretical 
articulation of Feyerabend‘s view, including some critical 
reflections. 
 
Keywords: legitimacy of counter-rules, open exchange, 
(de)contamination of evidence, scientific development, growth of 
knowledge, Feyerabend 
 
From the outset it must be stated that the epistemological 
contribution and approach of Feyerabend can rightly be 
understood only in the light of the developments of 20th 
century philosophy of science, and especially the famous 
1965 debate, where Karl Popper, Thomas S. Kuhn, Imre 
Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend, John Watkins, Stephen Toulmin, 
Margaret Masterman and others were faced (Lakatos & 
Musgrave, 1970). Though Kuhn's new view of Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions first published in 1962 had to be 
debated, because it overturned almost everything and 
restructured a new look on the development of science, the 
debate was in turn transformed into a general 
epistemological confrontation. It was argued for and against 
different viewpoints like the verificationism of logical 
positivism, which no longer had any representatives but 
inevitably had to be taken into account due to the specifics of 
their approach (Misak 1995, pp. 58-88), and Popper‘s 
falsificationism; as well the Kuhn‘s new epistemological 
theory has been hardly attacked. It turned, therefore, into an 
intellectual frontal confrontation between Karl Popper 
(Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970, pp. 51-58), Thomas S. Kuhn (pp. 
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1- 22, 231-277), Imre Lakatos (pp. 91-193) and Paul 
Feyerabend (pp. 197-230). There Kuhn excelled in defending 
his point of view - the development of science through the 
normal periods and scientific revolutions which happened 
from time to time.  The influence of Kuhn‘s theory emerged 
in that debate as well: Imre Lakatos (Lakatos & Musgrave, 
1970, pp. 91-193) introduced a theory similar to that of Kuhn, 
with a more philosophical formulation, merging the theory 
and methodical rules into the methodology of scientific research 
programmes. 
In this debate, Feyerabend (Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970, 
pp. 197-230) was presented with the "Consolations for the 
Specialist", where he presented an approach somewhat 
different from others, a very original aspect, the embryonic 
view which he would develop in a genuine epistemological 
theory in the Against Method firs published in year 1975. This 
view of Feyerabend was an extension encouraged by Kuhn's 
and Lakatos‘ epistemological theory, as an attempt to 
understand the historical configuration of science from a 
comprehensive approach. 
In the spectrum of modern epistemological theories of 
the 20th century, besides the verificationism of logical 
positivism, Karl Popper's falsificationism, Kuhn's paradigms 
shift as alternation of normal science-scientific revolution, 
the Lakatos's methodology of scientific research 
programmes, and the epistemology of Feyerabend had a 
meritorious place. All of these theories are puzzles that make 
up a mosaic of diverse views of science, of its problems and 
progress, including agreements, differences and 
contradictions, which also made good contributions but also 
led to mutual dismantling (Abazi, 2014, p. 413-422). 
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Given this historical context of the philosophy of 
science, a context somehow still current, the contribution of 
Feyerabend to the most relevant issues will be emphasized, 
including some of the epistemological implications which he 
brought. 
 
The epistemological necessity of breaking rules 
 
Like logical positivists including Alfred Ayer (1936, 1940, 
1956, 1959), Karl Popper (2002, 1962, 2009), Thomas S. Kuhn 
(1970, 1985) and Imre Lakatos (1970), Feyerabend has 
similarly derived his viewpoint from the history of science. 
It can be said that similar to the logical positivists, 
Popper Feyerabend realized that it was common for science 
to exist in a plurality of scientific theories. For the logical 
positivists, the plurality of the theories was applied on the 
local level and to particular theories. For Popper, 
alternatively, it was at the general level of theories, i.e. 
systems. Influenced by Kuhn and Lakatos, Feyerabend, too, 
re-concepted the word theory, giving a similar meaning to 
what Kuhn's paradigm or Lakatos's research programmes 
have. According to him, the science consists of two main 
components: the normal and philosophical component 
(Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970, p. 212). In this sense, the 
changes in the normal component are resistant, and when 
they occur, they are visible, while those of the philosophical 
component are both strong and noticeable (p.213). 
Apparently, the view of Feyerabend is a simplification of the 
concept of paradigm and the scientific research program, but 
it lacks a further elaboration. It can be said that in terms of 
the plurality of theories, Feyerabend is closer to the concept 
of logical positivists and Karl Popper as well as Lakatos on 
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pluralism of theories that, in addition to other aspects, 
influenced him to perceive the scientific situation as 
anarchist. 
However, there was something essential that the 
logical positivists or Popper did not understand, which 
Feyerabend did. The first considered that progress of science 
is possible by the inductive method and in their perception, 
this was the only scientific method; the latter, including 
Popper, considered solely the deductive method (i.e. the trial 
and error method). Contrasingly, Feyerabend (1993, 1978, 
1987) understood that there was not yet a method that could 
made possible the progress of science. Of course, science had 
advanced, but differently. 
Thomas S. Kuhn had argued that there is no such 
method to be valid inter-paradigmatically (Kuhn, 1970, p. 3), 
according to which one could determine to choose between 
rival paradigms. Moreover, he had set the rules on the 
second plan, and had claimed that science could function 
without any rules when there is a paradigm. He writes: 
―Paradigms may be prior to, more binding, and more 
complete than any set of rules for research that could be 
unequivocally abstracted from them‖ (Kuhn, 1970, p. 46). 
Feyerabend went further. By studying Copernican 
Revolution, especially Galileo Galilei's example of action, he 
understood that methodical rules could play a wholly 
different role from what the logical positivists or Karl 
Popperi surmised. 
If the implemented methodical rules are considered as 
compulsory, then they can at a given time become a 
hindrance to progress, having a conservative, deterrent role. 
This becomes visible especially at the time of dramatic 
developments when science has to make radical changes, i.e. 
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scientific revolutions, but that those changes are strictly 
prohibited by the rules of the method. In order to make the 
progress of science, one must act contrary to such 
prohibition. This is clearly expressed in Feyerabend (1993, p. 
14): 
 
... there is no single rule as convincing as it seems, and 
however well-based on     epistemology, which has not been 
violated at any time or else. It is clear that such violations are 
not accidental events, are not the result of insufficient 
knowledge or carelessness that could have been avoided. 
 
    Indeed, the breaking of the rules was (and is) an 
epistemologically necessary action to open the perspective of 
change, that is, to bring science out of deadlock. 
 
In what sense is the epistemological counter-rule 
helpful? 
 
In his masterpiece Against Method (1993, p. 14, 20) 
Feyerabend has clearly expressed his standpoint against 
fixed rules, and instead has advocated for counter-rules and 
has argued why they are valid and more functional. It can be 
said that the counter-rules are to science just as valuable as 
the rules itself, and in certain times, far more valuable than 
rules. Therefore, the action against the rules Feyerabend 
established –was the counter-inductive method (Feyerabend, 
1993, p. 20). 
Common scientific practice, according to the logical 
positivists, was to develop hypotheses in accordance with 
the facts so that they (i.e. hypotheses) could be empirically 
verified (Ayer, 1936, p. 6). According to Popper (2002, p. 66), 
scientists had to look for potential falsifiers within theories 
Some lessons from scientific practice on its development and growth of 
knowledge On Feyerabend‟s perceptive view in epistemology 
 Thesis, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2019     121    
or to develop opposing hypotheses to existing theories in 
order to refute them. Feyerabend put forward a different 
view, broadening it: 
Hypotheses, namely theories, could be developed 
differently, approached in the opposite perspective, i.e. 
counter-inductive manner. This method suggests, on the one 
hand, "the counter-rule that urges us to develop hypotheses 
inconsistent with accepted and highly confirmed theories ", 
and, on the other hand, the "the counter-rule that urges us to 
develop hypotheses inconsistent with well-established facts" 
(Feyerabend 1993, p. 20). 
Feyerabend continues by providing an explanation of 
how this can be done. He writes: ―Examining the principle in 
concrete detail means tracing the consequences of 
'counterrules' which oppose familiar rules of the scientific 
enterprise‖ (p. 20). This is based on the assertion that ―given 
any rule, however 'fundamental' or 'rational', there are 
always circumstances when it is advisable not only to ignore 
the rule, but to adopt its opposite ―(Feyerabend, 1993, p. 14). 
A common rule of scientific research is that "experience" or 
"facts" or "experimental results" are considered as a measure 
of the success of the theories. According to this rule, the 
agreement between a theory with the ‗data‘ favors the theory 
or leaves the situation unchanged, while the discrepancy 
risks it until elimination. This rule, being the core of 
empiricism, is an important part of all theories of 
confirmation and corroboration. The 'counterrule' 
corresponding to it advises us to introduce and elaborate 
hypotheses which are inconsistent with well-established 
theories and/or well-established facts. It also ―advises us to 
proceed counterinductively (Feyerbaend, 1993, p. 20). 
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First, it is known that, the creation of hypotheses 
contrary to prevailing theories has been highlighted by 
Popper in order to reject the ruling theory. But the purpose 
of Feyerabend is different: to know more from the theories 
that contradicts well-established ones. 
Secondly, the creation of hypotheses in opposite to well-
established facts is an original idea of Feyerabend. If it is 
possible to write such hypotheses and to be consistent, then 
chances are that knowledge into a different part of reality is 
to be achieved. This indicates that in the epistemological 
aspect Feyerabend aims to liberate scientists, but also 
philosophers, from the rigidity of approaches, from looking 
exclusively in one direction. Such a perspective is contrary to 
dogmatism, whether open or camouflaged, because it is non-
dogmatic (Abazi, 2018, pp. 103-122). 
This brings us to the explanation of Feyerabend 
concerning the epistemological usefulness of counter-
inductive action: ―Hypotheses contradicting well-confirmed 
theories give us evidence that cannot be obtained in any 
other way‖ (Feyerabend, 1993, p. 24). Thus, according to 
him, acting through the breaking of rules is absolutely 
necessary for the growth of knowledge (p. 14), of course, 
under certain conditions and circumstances, when such 
action actually allows the exit from the state of stagnation. 
 
The theory -counterinduction- a new theory 
relationship 
 
Against Method is an elaboration that, in some ways, strips 
the role of the method from the cloaks of myth, understood 
in its narrow and strict usage, pointing to cases where there 
is no other way of action except in contradiction to the rules 
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that had prevailed for decades and perhaps even for 
centuries. 
Unlike Francis Bacon (2003), René Descartes (2006), 
David Hume (1826) and others which tried to find a proper 
method for science (Abazi, 2018, pp. 108-115), there were 
some other philosophers who had seen in the other direction 
as well. One of them is Michael Oakeshot, who, in his 
"Rationalism in Politics" first published in 1947, had noted 
the negativity of the absolutizing role of the method, which 
he called "the sovereignty of technique" (Oakeshott, 1991, p. 
22). Another, as mentioned above, was Thomas Kuhn (1970, 
pp. 41, 46-47), who has shown that science, when there is a 
paradigm, can function without any rule. Hence, it can be 
said that Oakeshot, as well as Kuhn, were the forerunners of 
the viewpoint of Feyerabend. Unlike them, the latter 
managed to synthesize their views in his own way, 
eliminating the exclusivity of the technique's sovereignty. 
The result of this was the alternation theory-
counterinduction- as a new t approach. With the counter-
inductive action, Feyerabend showed that it is legitimate to 
approach well-established theories with the creation of new, 
alternative theories, as well as practical action of scientists. 
His viewpoint was clear: the science may advance by 
proceeding counter inductively (Feyerabend, 1993, p. 20). 
The alternation theory-counter-induction- a new 
theory as an approach, according to Feyerabend, aims to 
create research tolerance for the alternative actions in 
scientific practice by removing scientists from dogmatic 
tightening to methodical rules and theories. It was also a 
boost for the creation of new, alternative theories. 
Feyerabend rightly believed that if such freedom of choice, 
selection and action existed, unimpeded by the existing 
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rules, science would progress more freely, and knowledge 
would gradually increase unhindered. 
 
Contaminated evidence and objectivity issue 
 
Evidences are generally considered as independent, as data, 
which are as they are. This view was shared by logical 
positivists (Ayer, 1959, 144), taking them as natural, that is, 
they exist somewhere in nature as they are. But Karl Popper 
(2002, 37, pp. * 1) reveals another possibility, that the 
interpretations of observations are made in the light of 
theories. Thomas Kuhn (1970, p. 7) had gone even further, 
emphasizing that it was a paradigm that indicated not only 
what kind of entities universe contains but also what it does 
not contain. 
Feyerabend pays special focus to this aspect, making a 
valuable contribution. Epistemologists, e.g. Alfred Ayer and 
Karl Popper, talk about the mistakes contained in the 
theories about reality. But Feyerabend saw the issue from 
another perspective: ―it is not always the theory that is to 
blame‖ (Feyerabend, 1993, f. 52). And if so, then the issue 
should be treated differently, and that is exactly what 
Feyerabend did. 
Against the conditions and circumstances when the 
theories, especially the new ones, did not match the 
evidence, his focus was to understand why the evidence was 
inappropriate. In his examination, he understood that the 
problem could be in the evidence as well. ―Facts are 
constituted by older ideologies‖ asserts Feyerabend (1993, 
39). This concerns the facts known in a historical context of 
science with the "old ideologies" referring to existing 
theories, which are contrary to the new one. Based on this, 
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he concluded that "the evidence is contaminated" (Feyerabend, 
1993, p. 52).  
If that is the case, then it touches on an important 
epistemological issue: that the facts are objective, in the sense 
that they are independent and uninfluenceable from the 
views of scientists. The argument of Feyerabend that the 
evidence is contaminated reveals a major problem: the 
objectivity is not entirely objective, and therefore objectivity 
should be seen in another light. First and foremost, the facts 
do not always have primacy over theories. Therefore, one of 
the conditions for objectivity, according to Feyerabend, is the 
existence of different views, since the "Variety of opinion is 
necessary for objective knowledge" (Feyerabend, 1993, p. 32). 
The issue, indeed, is deeper. Feyerabend still breaks 
down more concretely. He writes that it ―is ... historico-
physiological character of the evidence, the fact that it does not 
merely describe some objective state of affairs but also 
expresses subjective, mythical, and long-forgotten views 
concerning this state of affairs, that forces us to take a fresh 
look at methodology‖ (Feyerabend, 1993, p. 52) 
Accordingly, ―it would be extremely imprudent to let 
the evidence judge our theories directly and without any 
further ado‖ (Feyerabend, 1993, f. 52). This results in a 
different methodological outlook: If the evidence expresses 
discrepancy with the reference of the new theory it may be 
indicative of something altogether else. Concretely ―a clash 
between facts and theories may be proof of progress‖ 
(Feyerabend, 1993, f. 39). 
With this difficulty of mismatching the facts with the 
new theory, he addresed the theories of Copernicus, and 
particularly Galileo (Feyerabend, 1993, p. 52). The latter‘s 
action, to which Feyerabend paid special attention as a case 
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study, is an illustration that clearly conveys what he means 
by the contamination of evidence, which will be put forward 
in the following. 
 
Decontamination is an infiltration of new language 
 
How did Galileo succeed to push forward heliocentrism, 
given that the evidence was contaminated with the ―old 
ideologies‖ of geocentrism? The answer is that he did this 
indirectly, as geocentrism was embedded in conviction and 
worldview, in belief, and was transformed into ―reality‖. In 
such a situation, it seems that the only mode of action was 
the stunt, using, according to Feyerabend (1993, p. 16), of 
"propaganda and coercion‖. Of course, not only that. In 
addition, "interests, forces, propaganda and brainwashing 
techniques play a much greater role than is commonly 
believed in the growth of our knowledge and in the growth 
of science‖ (p. 17). 
Of course, this was not the entire business, but just the 
foreplay. Such a foreplay, nonetheless is nonsensical, and not 
methodical. However, it turns out to be ―an unavoidable 
precondition of clarity and of empirical success‖ 
(Feyerabend, 1993, f. 16-17). Such action is no exception, but 
it is a normal act says Feyerabend (1993, p. 16). Of course, the 
condition and circumstances of the methodological stoppage 
was harsh in Galileo's time and its contestation was 
forbidden. Such actions, analogously, can also be made in 
any similar circumstance. 
One dimension of this action is directly and inevitably 
related to the scientific language, and from it the 
incommensurability, a thesis to which both Kuhn and 
Feyerabend arrived separately, but at the same time. This 
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thesis is related to the different languages that use different 
theories, suggesting that, to make them understandable, they 
should be translated. Such a theory like geocentric, its 
language, due to the long usage, is considered by all to be a 
"natural language". But it is not. It is just a language of a 
certain theory, a language that needs to be changed. This can 
be done by implanting the language of the new theory, e.g. 
of heliocentric, that would make the earth look like a planet 
and the sun as a non-planet, which is a very deep and 
substantive change. 
To understand developments of this kind in a general 
way, writes Feyerabend, ―we are, of course, obliged to 
appeal to the existing forms of speech ...which must be 
distorted, misused, beaten into new patterns in order to fit 
unforeseen situations‖. He continues that it is no coincidence 
but the rule that ―without a constant misuse of language 
there cannot be any discovery, any progress‖ (Feyerabend, 
1993, f. 18). 
That is what Galileo did, according to Feyerabend. By 
doing this, he decontaminated the observation, perception, 
experience and the way of understanding from the old 
language. He made the changes undeclared, that is, by 
infiltrating them, nourishing them with the new Copernican 
language, so that the evidence becomes perceptible in a new 
way. 
 
How did Galileo act? 
 
Feyerabend makes a breakthrough interpretation of Galileo 
Galilei's action. In the debate with the Aristotelians Galileo 
asserted the correctness of observations data, as well 
deactivated (rather than rejecting) the main argument 
Hajdin Abazi 
128     Thesis, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2019     
against the movement of the earth, aiming to change the 
conceptual system (Feyerabend, 1993, p. 55). Arguing that 
our perceptions through the senses may deceive, Galileo 
said: ―how easily anyone may be deceived by simple 
appearance, or let us say by the impressions of one's senses‖, 
and to avoid the deceives of senses is needed intervention of 
reason (p. 56). 
After the intervention of reason, although observations 
have not changed, new observational assertions are 
introduced, which play a better or worse role in our 
knowledge, whereby the appearance and affirmation are not 
two, but melted into one; that is to say that the appearance or 
phenomenon is just as the assertions say they are, and the 
language with which they speak is influenced by the beliefs 
of the early generations (Feyerabendi 1993, f. 57), which are 
called "natural interpretation" (p. 58). 
It is this natural language, being Aristotelian 
(geocentric) that had to be decontaminated, to make it 
possible to see reality differently, namely according to 
Copernican (heliocentric) language. Galileo, through the 
method of reminiscence, created the impression that nothing 
is changing and observations in the old family language are 
being repeated (Feyerabend, 1993, p. 58). ―It is, therefore, 
better‖ wrote Galileo on his book Dialogue Concerning the 
Two Chief World Systems, “to put aside the appearance, on 
which we all agree, and to use the power of reason either to 
confirm its reality or to reveal its fallacy‖ (Feyerabend, 1993, 
f. 58). Indeed, it was not that everyone agreed with the 
appearance, Galileo disagreed, but he said this with the deed 
to create the confidence of interlocutors that it would not be 
contested as such, as they had agreed. Attention was drawn 
elsewhere: what would be considered was appearance‘s 
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truthfulness, to achieve a confirmation or to reveal an error. 
Really, behind that was concealed the purpose to show that 
the appearance was wrong, and that a conclusion was to be 
achieved. 
This is obvious because natural interpretations are so 
intimately related to appearances (Feyerabend, 1993, 58). 
What Galileo did was to replace existing natural 
interpretation with another new one, so he inserted "a new 
observational language" (Feyerabend, 1993, 63). This was 
done without being noticed (Feyerabend, 1993, 65). In this 
sense, stresses Feyerabend, ―Galileo uses propaganda. He uses 
psychological tricks... These tricks are very successful: they 
lead him to victory‖ (Feyerabend, 1993, f. 65). 
Galileo intends to replace the conceptual system of 
absolute movement with that of the relative movement as 
valid for all cases (Feyerabend, 1993, pp. 69-70), partially 
revising the observation language or experience (p. 71). With 
this action of Galileo ―experience which partly contradicts 
the idea of the motion of the earth is turned into an 
experience that confirms‖ (Feyerabend, 1993, p. 71). 
Galileo expressed a simple example: while the boat is 
in motion if you look at sail yard it will appears motionless 
to you (Feyerabend. 1993, p. 67). Similar examples are: 
everyone can imagine that, for example, if you are within a 
navigating boat and look to shores it will appear to move the 
shores and not the boat, while if you are on the shore it 
appears that the shores do not move, but the boat. Such 
impressions, Galileo stressed, have been known since, but 
indeed they were the result of Galileo's propaganda 
machinery (Feyerabend, 1993, p. 71). In this way, he changed 
the conceptual system, also the experience, whereby the 
doctrine of Copernicus could be accommodated. Feyerabend 
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asserted that as a result of such changes ―the relative notions 
not only to boats, coaches, birds, but to the 'solid and well-
established earth' as a whole‖ can be practiced (Feyerabend, 
1993, f. 72).  
―It is this change‖ of notions meaning, concludes 
Feyerabend (1993, f. 72), which underlies the transition from 
the Aristotelian point of view to the epistemology of modem 
science‖. In other words, this is a part of how the triumph of 
Copernican revolution has become possible. 
 
The way of progress of science with open exchanges 
 
The path through which science advances in its headway is a 
very complex one. Since a view is accepted and embraced by 
the majority of the scientific community, a view of decades' 
or centuries' longevity turns somehow into a natural state, in 
something that is so, undisputed. Such was the situation 
when geocentrism ruled.   
Such a condition, by itself, becomes a barrier to 
fundamental change. At its service are the overwhelming 
majority of scientists, ecclesiastical institutions, the judiciary, 
and even the general public. Having this in mind, everyone 
can consider the big hindrances in the case of the Copernican 
hypothesis, ―whose invention, defense, and partial 
vindication runs counter to almost every methodological 
rule one might care to think of today‖ (Feyerabend, 1993, p. 
51). 
Change could be made at the outset to the way Galileo 
acted, not contesting observations but stealthily changing the 
conceptual content. Such acting was de facto against the 
rules of the game. In the circumstances of the prohibition of 
a different approach, the action that broke the rules was "a 
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necessity for progress" and this is "the fact of the history of 
science", which is also "reasonable and absolutely necessary 
for the growth of knowledge" (Feyerabend 1993, f. 14). 
This was done in practice whenever revolutionary 
changes were required, and from the perspective of 
advancing science, such actions were legitimate, as they are 
the only possible way for the necessary changes. 
Feyerabend has argued convincingly that the natural 
way to change the state is simply the counter-inductive 
action. From this derives that no methodology should be 
absolutized. In science there is nothing that can be said not 
to be allowed, if it makes possible the progress and growth 
of knowledge: 
 ―To those who look at the rich material provided by 
history, and who are not intent on impoverishing it in order 
to please their lower instincts, their craving for intellectual 
security in the form of clarity, precision, 'objectivity', 'truth', 
it will become clear that there is only one principle that can 
be defended under all circumstances and in all stages of 
human development. It is the principle: anything goes‖ 
(Feyerabend, 1993, f. 18-19).  
If this principle was to be accepted as a correct, legal 
action, then the methodological constraints are abolished. It 
means that scientists would be free to test different 
methodologies, different theories and hypotheses, as well as 
to examine evidence in order to achieve new knowledge 
differently. This acting, surely, would not harm science. On 
the contrary - it would help science develop more freely. 
Such a principle, indirectly, suggests a different approach to 
scientific developments: that of open exchanges 
(Feyerabend, 1993, pp. 227-228). 
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What had been understood by Feyerabend from the 
history of science and its greatest transformations was that 
the attitude and perception had to change. The defense at all 
costs of any epistemological point of view, no matter how 
good of a purpose it may have, can yield opposite results, 
even wholly inadvertently. Yet, so far, based on the history 
of science, science is an activity that changes, usually 
partially and rarely entirely, all the time, and it is obviously 
in its nature to be changed, as a process of advancement and 
growth of knowledge. But against this nature of science 
seem to operate the methodological rules when they are 
taken as inviolable and as universally valid, which prohibit 
actions outside the frames, prohibit changes, even thinking 
differently, that do not derive from its rules. When the state 
of non-change is also defended by the institutions of power, 
as was geocentrism by the Church, then all these, 
synchronized, turn into a developmental hindrance. The 
worst example of this and at the same time the most 
illustrative is the Inquisition. It is well known that it 
condemned to death Giordano Bruno in 1600. In 1616 it 
forbade Galileo the expression and defense of Copernicus 
views, sentencing him to house arrest in 1633 where he 
stayed until the end of his life (January 8, 1642). Likewise, in 
1616 the Inquisition cursed and banned the work of 
Copernicus and Galileo, as well as all the writings that were 
in the heliocentric spirit (Kuhn, 1985, p. 106). The violence, 
however, merely delayed and pushed the change for the 
future, but could not stop it. The change, as it is already 
known, occurred. 
Thus, from the history of triumph of Copernicanism it 
can be understood that violence, support from institutions, 
authority, and power is not the solution. As in the case of 
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geocentrism, such action can only cause victims, and makes 
the change more difficult. This was bad, wrong, and 
deterrent to the development of science, that's why it had to 
be changed. In this sense, Feyerabend advocated the 
separation of science from the state, just as the church was 
separated from the state. In this understanding, science 
should be developed according to its nature, character and 
internal conditions, without any external hindrances. In 
other words, a better, more flexible and open-minded 
approach to changes from the internal developmental 
processes of science were needed. 
He expressed a new view: the changes, assimilations, 
calibrations of views, traditions and approaches have to be 
done freely, without imposing and without dictation, i.e. 
through "open exchanges". Feyerabend (1993, pp. 227-228) 
expressed this in the following way: 
 
An open exchange... is guided by a pragmatic philosophy. 
The tradition adopted by the parties is unspecified in the 
beginning and develops as the exchange proceeds. The 
participants get immersed into each other's ways of 
thinking, feeling, perceiving to such an extent that their 
ideas, perceptions, world-views may be entirely changed - 
they become different people participating in a new and 
different tradition. An open exchange respects the partner 
whether he is an individual or an entire culture, while a 
rational exchange promises respect only within the 
framework of a rational debate. An open exchange has no 
organon though it may invent one, there is no logic though 
new forms of logic may emerge in its course. An open 
exchange establishes connections between different 
traditions and transcends the relativism ... However, it 
transcends it in a way that cannot be made objective but 
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depends in an unforeseeable manner on the (historical, 
psychological, material) conditions in which it occurs. 
 
Thus, if the scientific community and the society itself 
advance within the mentality of tolerance, freedom of choice 
and free determination of the alternatives that are 
considered appropriate by those who embrace them, and 
accordingly, changes would be made through open 
exchanges accepted voluntarily and only through persuasion 
the serious limitations, such as the rational exclusivity of a 
certain theory, as in the example of egocentrism would be 
avoided. It would facilitate changes. Scientific development 
in a milieu of tolerance, understanding, and naturalness 
should proceed in function of what, in essence, is everyone's 
intentions - the progress in science and the growth of 
knowledge.  
 
Conclusion: Feyerabend as a torch against prejudice 
and closed-minded 
 
Some of the novel thoughts, those most essential, that 
Feyerabend brought were discussed in this paper. His 
epistemological view, which expresses the intellectual 
permeasion of certain aspects that no one previously 
attempted, bring some new aspects of understanding to the 
fore such as the advancement character of counter-rules, the 
alternation of theory-counterinduction-a new theory, the 
contamination of evidence with old theories, the need for 
their decontamination, and open exchanges as a path of 
developing science in a tolerant way. 
It seems that the view of Feyerabend against the 
dogmatic character of method in scienceis historically right 
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by pointing to examples in history that illustrate the 
dangerous hindrances and restraints in the development of 
science if changes are banned, and how it could help if the 
counterinductive action was legitimized. In strengthening 
this, arguments that evidence is contaminated by old 
theories and must therefore be decontaminated as a 
condition for the emergence of new perspective were put 
forward. Through the counter-inductive approach, the 
principle that everything goes in order to reduce e 
hindrances, and open up exchanges in scientific activity, 
Feyerabend laid out an original epistemological point of 
view, in which a a tolerant road of development and 
progress of science can materialize. 
     Such a spirit turned into a view of the postmodern 
state: four years after the publication of the Against Method, 
Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984) broadly elaborated and pointed 
it out as a developmental stage in the Postmodern Condition 
first published in 1979. Particularly its two last chapters 
―Postmodern Science as the Search for Instabilities‖ and 
―Legitimation by Paralogy‖, considered by the author as the 
scientific approaches at present, are very similar to that of 
Feyerabend discussed in this paper. 
In conclusion, it should be underlined that anyone 
who sincerely deepens in the contributions of Feyerabend 
stressed above, understands how current they still are in 
reducing scientific prejudices of a closed-minded mentality. 
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